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INTRODUCTION 
The Dutch public transport reform 
The Dutch public transport regime was revolutionized by the introduction of a competitive 
tendering regime in 2001. Since then, the Dutch public transport legislation requires 
passenger transport authorities to determine their public transport policy goals, to determine 
concession areas and gradually to organize competitive tendering procedures to award these 
concessions in exclusivity to operators for periods than can currently extend to up to 8 years 
in the bus sector and 15 years in the railway sector. 
 
The former public transport legislation was based upon the principle of market initiative, 
whereby transport operators were supposed to behave as entrepreneurs and request 
authorizations to operate routes at an appropriate municipal or national government instance. 
This regime had, however, evolved towards public monopoly in practice, as public transport 
had ceased to be profitable in its own right in the 1960s and all operators except for some 
minor exceptions were publicly owned, either by municipalities or by the national 
government. Various forms of subsidization were used in the course of time. These evolved 
from simple deficit compensation towards more incentivising forms of subsidization at the 
end of the period. 
 
The new legislation from 2001 came with the institutionalization of the power of the 12 
Provinces and 7 urban area governments as public transport authorities, replacing the role 
played hitherto by central government as regulator of the public transport services outside 
specific urban areas. The provincial authorities had until then had no involvement in regional 
public transport and had to start to develop their policies and intervention in this sector. See, 
e.g., van de Velde and Leijenaar (2001) for more details on this transition. 
 
This new regime also changed fundamentally the market organization principle as it gave 
these authorities the monopoly right to provide public transport services. But this right came 
with the legal obligation to use competitive tendering to select operators. This obligation was 
introduced gradually and was only generalized to all public transport after an official 
(positive) evaluation of its first effects. At the beginning of 2007 government finally adopted 
the necessary measures to force the universal application of competitive tendering in Dutch 
public transport. This obligation is not, however, applicable to the concession for the national 
railway network.  
 
Note also that the major urban areas (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) 
received a preferential treatment by being allowed to postpone the compulsory usage of 
competitive tendering (CT) as far as the concessions currently held by municipal operators in 
their core cities were concerned. The current plans are to use CT in Amsterdam in 2012 for 
the whole of the services, and in 2009 for bus and 2017 for trams in Rotterdam and The 
Hague. Whether this will actually be enforce remains, however, to be seen as Parliament 
started a discussion in June 2007 to abolish the obligation to use CT in those areas, very much 
against the advice of the Ministry. This discussion was triggered by the recent adoption by the 
European Parliament of the long awaited Regulation on Public Service Obligations in public 
transport, which entitles passenger transport authorities with the right of self-production. 
 
Particularities of the Dutch regime 
Differently from many CT regimes introduced in other parts of Europe, the Dutch regime 
aims at stimulating innovation in service design in public transport. To this effect, the 
legislator aimed with the new passenger transport legislation from 2001 to give operators the 
power to (re-)design transport services (routes, timetables, fares, vehicles, etc.) during 
competitive tendering and/or during the contract period. This topic will be the main issue of 
this paper after this general introduction. 
 
In terms of procedure, a particularity of the Dutch regime is that the Ministry chose for a 
rather strict tendering procedure which prevents all forms of negotiation as part of regular 
procedures. Contrary to France which bases its tendering regime in public transport 
‘concessions’ on the necessity to have open negotiation, the Dutch regime is thus based on 
rather ‘mathematical’ multi-criteria evaluation procedures. 
 
Another essential particularity of the Dutch regime is its financing. Differently to many other 
parts of Europe, Dutch municipalities and provinces hardly have any own taxation powers. As 
far as public transport is concerned, the financial means are composed of transfers from 
central government which, until recently, could be spent exclusively on public transport. A 
recent legal change allows them to re-allocate monies for passenger transport services and 
(smaller) infrastructure investments in transport sectors. This central financing of public 
transport subsidies lead to a CT practice focusing on maximizing supply and quality for the 
existing budget, contrary to the Scandinavian practice of minimizing costs for the level of 
services requested. 
 
Results so far 
The introduction of CT in Dutch public transport was officially reviewed in studies 
commissioned by the Ministry of Transport (Hermans and Stoelinga, 2003). Until then, 
efficiency had indeed been improved, however growth of ridership could not be observed. 
Note that subsidy cuts imposed by central government during the same period blurred the 
observations. These studies and additional results led the government to enact the 
generalization of compulsory CT for the whole country in 2007. A shortcoming of the studies 
conducted at that time, is that they probably came too early to study the most interesting cases 
of CT giving service design freedom to the operators. Those only came later to fruition. 
Furthermore, they hardly focused on service design in the context of CT. 
 
In the meantime most of Dutch public transport (excluding the core of the four largest 
agglomerations) has been submitted to CT or will be tendered in the next year or so. This has 
led to a large reshuffle on the side of the suppliers. The main former player (VSN, as national 
bus company) has sold off its northern area to Arriva and its southern are to Veolia. The 
remainder became to be known as Connexxion. This rather clear geographical division soon 
disappeared with the generalization of CT as all three main operators are currently active 
throughout the whole country. The large cities remain the exceptions, though. Differently 
from many other countries, small operators are not present (with the exception, however, of 
one rather small cases). 
 
Competitive tendering and service design 
The Legislator’s dream and current practices 
As indicated above, one of the fundamental aims of the Dutch legislator with the enactment of 
the Passenger Transport Act in 2001, was to improve the attractiveness of public transport, 
using CT as a means to generate innovation or at least improvement in service design (see van 
de Velde and Leijenaar, 2001, for a longer description). While stimulating that aim, the law 
gave the passenger transport authorities substantial freedom in their concessioning practices, 
leaving the door open to ‘Scandinavian style’ CT, i.e. fully-specified services leaving no 
design freedom to the operators. 
 
Overview of evolving practices 
The allocation of service design power (i.e. the 'tactical level' in the terminology introduced 
by van de Velde, 1999) between transport authority and transport operator evolved. With now 
about 6 years of experience with CT, interesting developments can indeed be observed and 
opposite tendencies can be encountered.  
 
Earlier cases 
Earlier papers signalled the tendencies mentioned above (van de Velde and Pruijmboom, 
2005; van de Velde et al., 2005; van de Velde et al., 2006). In these earlier papers, we 
presented four cases of competitive tendering that we believed were illustrative of the 
divergent evolutions that could be observed in Dutch public transport. Two of the four cases 
represented an increase of service design powers for the operators. These were the cases 
North-Holland and South-Holland which, however, diverged substantially in their 
implementation. The two other cases represented a decrease of service design powers for the 
operators. These were the cases of North-Brabant and Groningen-Drenthe with, here too, 
divergent implementations.  
 
We will now add a brief description of additional cases (the tendering of regional/suburban 
bus concessions around Amsterdam) and add some information on the problematic 
competitive tendering procedures in the Province of North Brabant before moving to a more 
general analysis of the current situation. 
 
SRA (Stadsregio Amsterdam): Zaanstreek, Waterland and Amstelland-Meerlanden 
During the last two years, the City Region of Amsterdam organized three rather successful 
competitive tendering procedures for the three regional/suburban bus concessions around the 
city of Amsterdam. Public transport in the central urban area is still provided by the historic 
municipal operator. 
 
The results were as such: 
 
• The Zaanstreek concession (2004-2010) provided 30% more supply (in bus-
hours) for a 10% lower budget, while the operator promised a revenue growth of 
more than 25%. 
• The Waterland concession (2005-2011) provided 50% more supply (in bus-hours) 
for a 10% lower budget, while the operator promised a revenue growth of more 
than 35%. 
• The Amstelland-Meerlanden concession (2007-2015) provided 60% more supply 
(in bus-hours) for a 5% lower budget, while the operator promised a revenue 
growth of more than 50%. 
 
A particularity of the approach of the Amsterdam City Region is the usage of very 
incentivising contracts without lump-sums. The full amount of payment from the authority to 
the operator is variable and entirely dependent upon the realized ridership. The amount of 
compensation per passenger-km is determined through the bidding by dividing the available 
budget (pre-determined) by the promised passenger ridership for each year. The realized 
number of passenger-km then determined the actual subsidisation for each year of the 
concession. The contracted service supply level has to be realized. 
 
In the Zaanstreek and Waterland areas, the operator only received a functional definition of 
the services to provide in the CT procedure. Interestingly, in the third concession in time, 
services were largely pre-determined by the authority. One reason for this was the complexity 
of the interaction with local authorities, and their various wishes. And also the realization that 
even a functional definition of services sometimes boils down to a set of constraints that is 
almost similar to full specification.  
 
In the meantime, the Waterland concession won by Arriva is reported to have generated 
interesting behaviour by the operator as this operator even started to provide new routes upon 
its own initiative and thus without need for additional payments. The third concession will 
start operation in December 2007. 
 
North Brabant: official evaluation 
In addition what was mentioned in the earlier paper (van de Velde and Pruijmboom, 2005), 
the series of problems encountered in the Province of North Brabant in public transport 
tendering has now led to an official provincial evaluation enquiry. Due to the problems that 
appeared in the CT procedure, the elected politicians of the Province decided to create a 
research committee to analyse the facts with the 2005 and the 2006 CT. Besides providing 
information, the aim of the enquiry was also to prevent similar mistakes from happening 
again. Here are only a few observations collected from that report (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
2007): 
 
• The ambitions of the Provincial Government and its civil servants were too high 
in several respects. In time: half a year to prepare the CT, three month to carry it 
out and six month lead time before implementation. In space: simultaneous CT of 
all public transport under the responsibility of the Province. In design: the 
authority would provide a detailed programme of requirements of the services to 
produce. In legal and procedural terms: attempting to work exactly according to 
the legal requirements. By sticking strictly to these aims, the Province had also 
eliminated for itself any space it had for adaptation during the procedure. 
• Interestingly, the report concludes that several aspects play a role when attempting 
to reach agreements with other parties. Besides content (realising policy aims) and 
finance (reasonable price), the ‘relationship factor’ also plays an important role (is 
the nature of the contact between the parties such that adequate business can be 
realised?) The enquiry concluded that the relationship between authority and 
operator seemed to be characterised by distrust, ‘playing games’ with each other, 
opportunistic behaviour by the operator, etc. In reaction to this, the Province 
adopted a rather formal stance and legal aspects started to dominate the contacts. 
The opinions of the operator were, e.g., considered to be of no relevance for the 
preparation of the CT such as to prevent discrimination. Consultation documents 
for the first tendering and preparation documents for the second tendering were 
sent to many actors, but not to the operator. Signals given by the incumbent that 
the evaluation model included in the first tendering could be manipulated were set 
aside on the basis of formal grounds. Earlier on, when the Province decided on 23 
March 2004 not to make use of the possible prolongation of the existing 
concessions but to start a new CT procedure for services starting on 1 January 
2006, the incumbent (BBA) protested against this decision. This was declared 
partially founded on 14 September 2004 as the Province did not discuss this 
decision with the incumbent as contractually required, as the concession targets 
had actually been amended in common agreement and as unforeseen changes had 
taken place (budget cuts by central government, unachievable assumptions in the 
concession and intermediate changes in the policy aims of the Province). 
• The report stresses that the Province all too often took the strictest possible 
interpretation of legal advice because of a fear for legal procedures. The 
committee describes this behaviour as not adequate as distrust cannot be the basis 
of good business. One conclusion was that the absence of a sufficiently clear legal 
framework (especially in procedural terms) largely contributed to a risk averse 
behaviour by the authority, to a formalisation of relationship and on a greater 
distance between operator and authority. In combination with the authority’s 
desire to reach clear results quickly, avoiding further legal procedures, this led to 
even more procedural strictness and stiffness.  
• One of the main advices of the committee is to reconsider the existing public 
transport legislation as framework for CT in public transport. A main problem, 
according to the committee, is the unlucky coupling of public law instruments 
within the law where the authority uses unilateral decisions and subsidy payments 
to realise its policy aims, with the attempt to make use of private law mechanisms 
with market players. Behind this, the committee asked the question whether 
alternatives could be found to realise the steering role of the Province without 
having to determine so many things contractually. Finally, the committee 
concludes that if the public law construction has, for some reason, to be 
maintained, that this should be considerably shortened and simplified. The current 
procedure is now found to be determined by a complex pile-up of all too many 
laws and regulations that overlap each other but do not always coincide. 
Summary of evolutions 
We can present the evolutions that we have studies schematically (see below), using a graph 
developed earlier (Preston and van de Velde, 2002) to categorize the main possible allocations 
of the tactical level between operator and authority. The particularity of this graph is that it 
distinguishes between two periods: 
 
• The three columns indicate the localization of the tactical level (T) during the 
bidding phase (in the bid, in negotiations or pre-determined by the authority); 
• The three rows indicate the localization of the tactical during the contractual 
period: on the side of the authority (fixed for the operator), or on the side of the 
operator but with or without prior check by the authority. 
The numbering and corresponding arrows illustrate the changes that have taken place in the 
successive rounds of competitive tendering. 
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Legend: 
 ZH-DAV: South Holland – Drechtsteden-Alblasserwaard-Vijfherenland 
 NH-N: North Holland – Noord 
 NH-HIJ: North Holland – Haarlijn/IJmond 
 NBr: North Brabant 
 GGD: Groningen-Groningen-Drenthe 
 SRA-W: City Region Amsterdam – Waterland 
 SRA-AM: City Region Amsterdam – Amstel- en Meerlanden 
 
As can be seen in the graph above, quite opposite evolutions can currently be observed. While 
some authorities move from bottom-right towards top-left, others make exactly the opposite 
movement.  
 
The experience in North Brabant indicates many similarities with what happens in concession 
areas where the authority had already decided to specify rigidly the tactical level, such as in 
the GGD-area: the authority is not satisfied with the performance of the incumbent, this leads 
to a worsening of the relationship with the operator and consequently to a rigid definition of 
the tactical level by the authority at the next tendering round. 
 
This being said, a closer look at our sample of cases also reveals that the tendency of some 
authorities to increase the level of constructive specification of the tenders at the expense of 
functional tenders must be somewhat nuancated. What can be observed in practice is that an 
increasing level of specification in terms of routing, frequency and vehicle (as seen in the case 
of the Amsterdam City Region), does not necessarily entail the same level of specification in 
term of commercial freedom (communication, information and fares).  
 
Analysis 
Let us now look at the general experience of CT in the Netherlands at a more general level by 
referring to a number of studies that, directly or indirectly, analyse the current functioning of 
competitive tendering in relation to the tactical level. 
 
Opinions on the use made by operators of their design freedom 
A report published by a research centre co-funded by national and regional authorities 
contains a number of interesting interviews and citations from various actors involved in 
public transport tendering, both on the side of the authorities and on the side of the operator. 
This report (KPVV, 2006) provides a few examples of frustrations or punctual experience that 
could, in the longer run, influence choices of authorities in their localisation of the tactical 
powers: 
 
• In one example budget cuts imposed by central government proved to reduce the 
space available for policy making and for the tactical level by the operators. 
Referring to an operator, the report mentioned the problem of budget cuts, leading 
to the need to suppress some services, but local politicians requesting to upkeep 
the social routes. In combination with the existing incentivising contract, such 
new constraints make the realisation of the contractual goals illusory as resources 
have then to spend to a higher proportion on those lines than expected, and not on 
the most successful lines that could easily generate the revenue growth promised 
and expected from the operator.  
• In another example the operator proved to make only limited use of the tactical 
freedom given. As a regional civil servant mentioned, operators often seem not to 
dare to take initiatives going beyond marginal changes to the existing services.  
• In a third example there proved to be still substantial influence of politicians on 
the transport product. As a local civil servant mentioned, even if the operators 
have been given the freedom to redevelop services, the public often continues to 
see the municipality as the responsible organisation. Even if it is made clear to the 
passenger that he should take contact with the operator, when the operator does 
not respond quickly enough to complains, the passenger is likely to take contact 
with local politicians or the media and through this generate political intervention. 
Keeping distances, as the contract foresees, proves to be difficult in this case. 
 
Expert evaluation of the current functioning 
An expert-meeting recently organized by the Ministry of Transport aimed identifying 
possibilities for improvements in the quality of the tendering process in public transport. The 
findings of this meeting (KPVV and inno-V, 2007) can be seen as complements to the advice 
on concession management that was produced at the end of 2006 (Lutje Schipholt et al., 
2006). An initial remark should be made: operators were very active in the meeting and 
seemed to worry about other things than what authorities are worried about in the current 
functioning of the tendering regime. Here are a few of the points that came out of that 
meeting: 
 
• The cooperative spirit formerly present in the sector has been replaced by a more 
aggressive form of relation. Although relations could be even more ‘business-
like’, concession texts should not be too restrictive: business-like should not mean 
‘stiff’. Furthermore, ‘business-like’ should work both ways, although authorities 
do not always behave like this. Even so, making things operational can turn out to 
be difficult as one always forgets to organise ‘something’ and that is exactly 
where things will go wrong. It is then dangerous when authorities start to interpret 
the norm in the contract as the ‘truth’. The basis must be ‘trust’. A business-like 
set-up is OK as long as this does not stand in the way of the relation and of 
flexibility. Less energy should be spent in the codification of all eventualities in 
contract terms. It is much more important to describe the procedures that should 
be followed when circumstances change. 
• Several recommendations were made, pertaining to the implementation of 
concessions submitted to CT. These recommendations are a direct result of recent 
problems where authorities had manoeuvred themselves and their operators into 
by imposing too short lead times between concession award and service start. The 
North Brabant case is perhaps the most well known, but problems had also 
appeared earlier at the first implementation of the DAV-concessions in South-
Holland. The large size of some of the concessions let and their resulted into too 
many concessions being let at the same time. Problems with the rolling stock also 
appeared and, more importantly, implementation is now all too often hampered by 
court cases initiated by losing bidders. The experts also suggested organising 
rolling stock leasing through the tendering authorities. 
• Another problem appeared in relation to timing and one of the ideas was to avoid 
forcing the operators to realise a ‘double big bang’ which consists of having too 
many CT-procedures at the same time and requesting from the operators to 
implement all innovations right at the start of the concession. The advice was to 
allow them to start operations with the ‘old’ timetable. 
• Some of the problems mentioned related to the nature of the authorities 
procedures. The experts suggested that authorities will have to realise that their 
meeting and decision cycles may be too slow and that authorities are too unaware 
of the consequences of this.  
• Experts stressed that there has to be a good fit between the awarding criteria and 
the general ‘atmosphere’ of the ToR, which itself should clearly describe the goals 
to be achieved. As far as the ToR and the evaluation of bids are concerned, a clear 
distinction should be made between obligations and wishes. Also, authorities 
should attempt to provide as much transparency as possible as to the weighing of 
criteria in the bid valuation. Yet, an essential challenge is to prevent that bidders 
‘pre-calculate’ the risk fines and penalties in their bidding. The meeting also 
recommended that those persons who valuate the qualitative part of bids have no 
information on the quantitative part of the bids.  
• Another problem related to authorities is that these seem to have too little 
knowledge on the cost consequences of many of their choices, obligations and 
wishes in the context of tendering. Furthermore, authorities should refrain from 
wanting all at once. They would be better advised to keep some budget aside to 
amend or order additional things later during the contract. For this purpose, 
flexibility should be allowed during the contract period, but it requires clear 
calculation. The ToR should provide sufficient space to allow for this to take 
place.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Central planning or functional specifications for the future of Dutch public transport? 
In confirmation of the conclusion of a former paper on this topic (van de Velde et al., 2006), 
we can still observe a variety of configurations within the institutional setting both at the 
governance level and at the contractual level. There is also some additional confirmation of 
the appearance of the tactical level as a separate or half-separate institution. 
 
Some transport authorities chose strategies that gave substantial service redesign freedom to 
their operators in a first contracting round, either during the contracting stage and/or during 
contract realization, this in conformity with the aims of the new legislation. Later some of 
these authorities moved to a completely opposite stance by keeping almost all service design 
powers in-house. As observed in the cases presented, there are roughly speaking two extreme 
models at the moment in the Dutch tendering practice: 
 
• Substantial freedom for the operator: trust on the creativity of the operator, service 
design on the side of the operator, functional tendering, revenue risk for the 
operator, award based on the quality of the plans, steering through realised output 
usually with a rather high bonus/penalty system, role of consumers’ organisations 
directed at judging the plans of the operators and at evaluating the quality during 
the concession. Examples: Rijn en Bollenstreek-Midden-Holland, Drechtsteden-
Alblasserwaard-Vijfherenland, Limburg Zuid en Midden, Haarlem-IJmond en 
Fryslân. 
• Service design by the authority: keep the determination of the quality level on the 
side of the authority, service design by the authority, detailed service 
requirements, guarantee of minimum service, revenue risk shared between actors, 
award on quantities such as price and service hours, evaluation based on inputs, 
role of consumers’ organisations directed at the authority during the concession 
period. Examples are: Almere Stad, IJsselmond, Zeeland; and even more so in 
North Brabant and Groningen, Drenthe (GGD) and Haaglanden where service 
design is concentrated on the side of the authority. 
 
The following graph gives an illustration of what we consider to be a good balance between 
service design and steering within the concession: 
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Indeed many other aspects have to be looked into when considering the relation between 
authority and operator, but an appropriate equilibrium between steering instruments is of 
utmost importance: obligations, award criteria, bonuses and penalties, etc. When few 
obligations are formulated, the contract will need to contain sufficient incentives to stimulate 
the operator to provide market-led services. But such incentives will indeed make little sense 
when the authority has pre-determined the services to supply. Both extreme cases are feasible, 
and well as intermediate ones, and the most important thing is to realise a good equilibrium 
between the items mentioned. Failing to do so will severely increase the chances for failures. 
 
Relationship problems 
Despite the advice above, time pressure and the legal problems that appeared during earlier 
CT-procedures have led some authorities to adopt a more formal and distant relation between 
operator and authority during recent years. This then sometimes generated a climate of 
distrust, penalties and the tendency for those authorities to specify more rigidly the tactical 
level. 
 
Note, however, that the relationship problems mentioned here do not appear in all cases of CT 
in the Netherlands. The majority of cases functions without problem, even if a small minority 
of problems is indeed responsible for quite some media and political attention. This may then, 
perhaps unduly, influence the general opinion on the current success of CT. 
 
One main point comes out of the opinions of the experts cited in this paper. And that is a very 
clear call for more ‘relational contracting’. The experts stressed the need for agreement on 
process instead of attempting to write down complete contracts. This is indeed a very well 
known theoretical debate, and it is interesting to see it appear so clearly in this context. 
Relational contracting is about trust and partnership, it is more demanding for the contracting 
parties and one has to remember that trust is the result of repeated experience. 
 
Further research work 
The question then is whether the current legal regime stands in the way of the development of 
such trusting relationships. Is it only a question of learning the new roles by the actors, or are 
more fundamental changes required? Will the business world prove to be compatible with the 
spirit of public administration? 
 
With a few years of competitive tendering and contract realization experience in the 
Netherlands, it now becomes possible to review what use operators made hitherto of the 
contractual freedom contracted to them. Further research will do this in a qualitative and 
quantitative way for the selected and some additional tendered concessions, analyzing the 
evolution of services supplied and the reasons behind the service changes observed (authority-
initiated or operator-initiated). Where data is available, the authority’s strategies will be 
combined with realized performances (such as passenger growth and efficiency gains) to 
come to an overall conclusion of the effect of the various strategies. 
 
In parallel to these observations, we will further categorize the reasons that have led transport 
authorities to modify the allocation of service design power between operator and authority in 
successive tendering rounds. This information will result from structured interviews that are 
currently being held to cover a number of interesting cases across the Netherlands. 
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